Morsi president…A victory with the taste of defeat
Thursday, 21 June 2012 23:00 GMT
The results of Egypt's presidential elections will soon be officially announced… It is more likely that Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, will be the winner. But the short distance between him and the "felool" (belonging to the former regime) candidate Ahmed Shafiq keeps the door open for speculation and mutual accusations until the last minute.
Morsi won but Shafiq was not defeated… Morsi's win is flavoured with the taste of defeat.
He gained half of the votes of those who participated in the elections - not much more than a quarter of the electorate - who represent the bloc that includes the Salafists and Brotherhood. Most of the Salafists and the supporters of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, in addition to hundreds of thousands of voters, whose numbers we don't know, have voted for Morsi just to make sure Shafiq fails, and intercept the remnants of the dissolved regime and prevent them from returning to power. This is a fact that should be admitted.
Those who are delighted with the win should contemplate well the reason behind the felool nominee's vote gain of about half of the voters (a quarter of the electorate) in a country whose revolution, which is the widest and the noblest, has not left its streets and squares.
Some of those who voted for Shafiq are of the felool, or convinced with their black propaganda, but many of those who voted for him did so in defiance and fear of the Brotherhood and their political/religious project -- the Brotherhood did not succeed in making it “the alternative democratic national project.”
Some of those who voted for Shafiq – whose numbers we may know in the future -- did so in light of what they had witnessed, sins committed by groups during the revolution. We have devoted an article to list them in detail and here we just mention some of them: Trying to win both the revolution and the ruling junta, abandoning the revolution at some stage, breaking pledges and denying them (non-participation in presidential elections), a tendency towards hegemony and monopoly (their story with Aboul Fotouh and the constituent body), and their desire that they could not monopolise all the areas of power and rule the county.
The problem of the president-elect -– in addition to the intractable problems of Egypt that he will find himself having to deal with -- is that he will be sworn in before a constitutional court which caused the dissolution of his Islamist majority parliament, and that enabled his political rival and competitor to engage in the midst of elections until the last ballot.
The problem is that he will assure his work with incomplete powers which the ruling junta could steal part of, most prominently the legislative authority and the formation of the panel that will form the new constitution, especially after the announcement of the complementary constitutional declaration.
We will have an unarmed president, without powers, surrounded by institutions of a judicial, security and military state that is not friendly to him, secretly and openly.
It will even work using all its strength and tools to thwart his stay in office. The talk about the early presidential elections has started even before the official announcement of the results, and there are those who say this president is an interim one whose term will not exceed two years.
But the president, backed by the Brotherhood, can be armed with Tahrir Square, or can escape to it, as it is the last citadel of the revolution. But he should do that with honest intentions this time, and an opening up and participatory will with all the revolutionary powers and components of Egyptian society, without exception.
It is true the wall of trust between the Brotherhood and the rest of the Egyptian revolutionary components have collapsed, and it is true that a main part of this collapse was done at the hands of the Brotherhood themselves. But it is also true that the opportunity to correct the imbalance, bridge the gaps, conduct self-examination, exercise criticism and self-criticism, and therefore rectify what can be rectified, has not gone yet.
The truth is that what happened in Egypt during the last year of elections, referendums, constitutional declarations and other complementary ones is a “rehearsal” for the bigger tests the country will face. It is a chance for everyone to pause and review the self and the other, and mobilise powers and build coalitions away from the effervescence of the revolution. This is essential after everybody, the Brotherhood in particular, has become aware that the old regime has not raised the white flag yet , and has not lost its tools, bases and influence and that danger to the revolution and its gains still exists.
It is also an opportunity for the powers of democratic reform and change in the country to mobilise the rows, build momentum and unite. Egypt's fate is not limited to Morsi and Shafiq, the Brotherhood Leader and Field Marshal, Brotherhood and felool…There are other spaces that should be counted on and developed. The phenomenon of the Egyptians voting for Shafiq due to “Brotherhood phobia” should not be repeated. Also, Morsi should not gain votes of those who decided there is no return of the old regime with its corruption and tyranny…Egyptians should not remain captives of this “dualism,” at all costs.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.